Ideologies v. Guns, and Hope as a Strategy

It is good to know that leftist logic never changes.  

A quote from President Obama yesterday, that would have been right at home in protests of the 1960's....

"...in order for us to defeat terrorist groups like ISIL and al Qaeda it's going to also require us to discredit their ideology -- the twisted thinking that draws vulnerable people into their ranks.  As I’ve said before -- and I know our military leaders agree -- this broader challenge of countering violent extremism is not simply a military effort.  Ideologies are not defeated with guns; they’re defeated by better ideas..."

Hmmm, are we sure about that?

http://www.protestwarrior.com

Now, yes, evil ideologies must be supplanted by better ideas, but most times that supplanting must be done at the point of a gun.  Those nasty evil guns....and lots of soldiers with guns, occupying enemy territory, and delivering defeat.

"Know what really discredits ideologies? Unconditional surrender, occupying their capitals, wrecking their cities, defeating their armies." - @20Committee

To use a time tested maxim, "Hope is not a strategy".  And "No Boots on-the-Ground" is not a winning strategy either.  

Better ideas can't retake Ramadi.  Better ideas can't retake Mosul.  And better ideas can't defeat ISIL.

Not on their own.  Our better ideas require guns to conquer the evil ideas that are washing over the landscape unabated.

Evil ideologies are not just defeated with guns, they’re defeated by better ideas backed by the threat, even the use, of guns.  The sooner the President realizes that, the better.

Consequences of Delaying the Afghan Decision

Over at Bouhammer's Afghan Blog, an Afghan vet lays out why President Obama's delay in making a decision on an Afghan surge will make things a lot more complicated.

Dear Mr. President:
Posted By The Dude on December 6, 2009

Now that I’ve had a few days to ingest, digest, and perform my own mission analysis on your new plan for Afghanistan, I’m a bit concerned. My concerns are based from my experiences of being on one end of the spectrum at the tip of of the spear defending freedom in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions, to the opposite end of that spectrum in Kuwait serving in the logistical nerve center for both Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

Some points to consider....

- Winter is coming has already arrived in Afghanistan. Had this decision been made during the summer, any surge of forces to the north and the east of the country could have beaten the winter conditions. Now it will be more difficult.

- With the upcoming drawdown in Iraq, logistics hubs and transport will be very busy in 2010. Add ina surge to Afghanistan, and you get a logistics nightmare. Had this decision been made during the summer, then some of the surge movement could have preceded the Iraq drawdown, and thus avoided future scheduling conflicts. I feel for my Army logistician and Air Force airlift brethren over the coming year...

Perhaps this should not come as any surprise, especially concerning the office of the President of the United States, but decisions (or lack thereof) have consequences. And even seemingly trivial decisions can have cascading effects. However when it comes to military matters in times of war, there are no trivial decisions, and the cascading effects can have serious consequences.

It can only be in Washington where 'a decision delayed is a decision made'. I don't think they teach that up at West Point, Mr. President.

Wild Dreams and Military Strategy

Instapundit has linked to a disturbing quote from Obama, which reveals much on what we can expect from his prospective administration's national security strategy.

“I think that the surge has succeeded in ways that nobody anticipated,” Obama said while refusing to retract his initial opposition to the surge. “I’ve already said it’s succeeded beyond our wildest dreams.”

This quote is absurd on many levels, but here are two thoughts:

1 - The surge did not "[succeed] in ways that nobody anticipated". It in fact succeeded in the ways that the military strategists who devised it had anticipated. The goals (broadly) of the surge were to reduce the internecine violence that was rife, and set the conditions for democratic governance. When Petraeus et al set forth with the "Surge", this is the result they "anticipated". Had it not been, then they probably would not have executed the plan. Perhaps someone should tell Mr. Obama that you only execute a strategy with the anticipation of success, not with the anticipation of failure.

2 - Military and National Security strategies, when properly done, are not based upon "wild dreams". Perhaps this best demonstrates the difference on how the two ends of the political spectrum devise these strategies. On the left, strategy is often based on "our wildest dreams". This "peace-in-our-time", "can't-we-all-just-get-along approach". Somehow this is now referred to as "realism". Unfortunately, "Hope" is not a strategy. The surge was not based on the hope that we could be victorious, or the wild dream that we could succeed, it was built on many hours of sober and realistic assessments of the existing situation, and study of what had succeeded in the past.

Unfortunately, our future may hold security strategy that is based on the "wildest dreams" that the Iranians will give up their quest for nuclear weapons based on our newly installed, and ever so hopeful Ivy League diplomats. Or based on the "hope" that Russia will play nice if we simply ignore their attempts to re-annex portions of other sovereign nations.

A sober review of history will reveal that this sort of approach does not have a record "[succeeding] in ways that nobody anticipated". But rather it has a disturbing tendency to "fail in ways that many anticipated", except for those who were implementing the approach.

Once again, Hope is not a strategy.

More 'Grim Milestones', or just Grim Outlooks?

Today Gateway Pundit and NRO's Tank point out the good news in Iraq, the continuing and rapid decline of US troop deaths. Why is it that despite this good news, the MSM can only give us their own grim outlook?

I have opined on this subject before, and would like to point out that the news is even slightly better than it appears. The casualty statistics that have been trumpeted in all the media's "grim milestone" reporting are all inclusive. They include everything to include traffic acidents, heart attacks, and even deaths outside of Iraq.

Take a look at today's reporting which hypes the fact that this year was the "deadliest year".



While all the numbers you will read like those above will say 901 (UPDATED) troops died this year. But in fact, if you look at true "hostile fire" casualties, the number is only 765. That is a 15% difference, which is not insignificant.

As Gateway and The Tank mention, the month of Dec 2007 has seen only 24 (up from earlier) deaths, the lowest since Feb 2004. However, this number does include 10 non-hostile deaths which includes injuries and traffic accidents. So in reality, there were only 14 hostile fire deaths in Dec.

No matter how you cut it the statement that this was the "Deadliest Year Ever", while factually acurate, is a loaded statement and willfully disregards the current ground truth.

Additionally, I have always thought that a better way to look at this 'metric' (if you will) is to look at it as "Hostile Deaths per day".



While the graph looks much the same as the regular monthly metric, the ratio takes some of the ambiguity out of the numbers.

The bottom line of course is that no matter how you look at it, the numbers are down dramatically, and it leads back directly to the change in strategy.

Why is it so hard for the media to recognize this and change their tune? Could it be that they are pursuing an agenda??

Books to win Wars

The other day I had a little fun with my Army brothers concerning Counter-Insurgency. However, I do feel strongly on the subject, especially on how the Air Force has a lot to learn when it comes to our role in such a fight. We are still caught in an Air Supremacy paradigm, and need to do more thinking on how we can be relevant in a 'Small War'

The new edition of Air & Space Power Journal dedicates its current edition to 'Irregular Airpower'. It should make for interesting reading, and is in my queue.

Now speaking of Small Wars.....

The Army is continuing its drive to incorporate Counterinsurgency education at all levels, to include our coalition partners, with its Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Academy.

"Six years into the Afghan war, the Army has decided its troops on the ground still don't understand well enough how to battle the Taliban insurgency. So since the spring, groups of 60 people have been attending intensive, five-day sessions in plywood classrooms in the corner of a U.S. base here, where they learn to think like a Taliban and counterpunch like a politician.

The academy's principal message: The war that began to oust a regime has evolved into a popularity contest where insurgents and counterinsurgents vie for public support and the right to rule. The implicit critique: Many U.S. and allied soldiers still arrive in the country well-trained to kill, but not to persuade."

To help out this effort, the Small Wars Journal and some others have put together a book drive of sorts to help stock the bookshelves at this Academy.

So, if you really would like to help he U.S. and its allies prevail in its current fight, then go to the SWJ's Amazon wish-list, and buy a book or two for the Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Academy (books delivered directly to Kabul).